Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Navigating Accountability, Ethics, and Governance in the Age of Intelligent Machines

Japji[1*]
[1]Research Scholar, Department of Laws, Punjabi University, Patiala, India

* Corresponding Author: Email: japji35@gmail.com

Abstract: The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has outpaced the development of adequate legal frameworks capable of addressing the novel challenges they present. This article examines the intersection of AI and law across five critical dimensions: the conceptual limits of existing legal categories; the allocation of legal liability for AI-caused harm; the protection of fundamental rights in automated decision-making systems; the emergent questions of intellectual property and data ownership in AI-generated content; and the global landscape of AI governance and regulation. Drawing on recent legislative developments—including the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (2024), the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI (2024), proposed regulatory measures in the United States and India, and evolving jurisprudence across common law and civil law jurisdictions—this article argues that existing legal doctrines are structurally ill-equipped to govern autonomous systems and that a new paradigm of technology-sensitive legal reasoning is urgently required. The article contends that effective AI governance must be grounded in interdisciplinary dialogue between legal scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, economists, and policymakers, and must be coordinated internationally to prevent regulatory fragmentation and arbitrage.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, legal liability, algorithmic accountability, AI governance, EU AI Act, autonomous systems, due process, intellectual property, machine learning, human rights.

1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence is no longer the province of science fiction or academic speculation. It is an operational reality embedded in the most consequential social processes of contemporary life—credit scoring, criminal risk assessment, medical diagnosis, employment screening, content moderation, financial trading, and autonomous vehicular navigation, to name only a few. The global AI market, valued at approximately $200 billion in 2023, is projected to exceed $1.8 trillion by 2030, and the pace of deployment shows no signs of deceleration.

Yet the law, bound by its inherent conservatism and its foundational reliance on precedent and analogy, has struggled to keep pace with this transformative velocity. The legislative response has been fragmented, the judicial response hesitant, and the scholarly response—while prolific—has not yet coalesced around a coherent new paradigm. The result is a growing governance gap: a widening chasm between the operational reality of autonomous, adaptive systems and the legal frameworks nominally responsible for regulating them.

The fundamental challenge is one of ontological mismatch. Law has historically conceived of its principal subjects as human agents—natural persons possessing intention, foresight, capacity for deliberation, and susceptibility to culpability. AI systems, particularly those built on deep learning architectures, are not agents in this philosophical sense. They are probabilistic inference engines that optimise for specified objectives in ways that may be opaque, emergent, and irreducible to intentional action. The legal question is not merely how to hold such systems accountable, but whether accountability—as legal doctrine has conceived it—is the right organising principle at all.[1]

This article proceeds in six substantive parts. Part II situates the discussion within the broader literature on law and emerging technologies, tracing the evolution of legal responses to disruptive innovation and identifying the distinctive conceptual challenges posed by AI. Part III analyses liability frameworks as applied to AI-caused harm, proposing a risk-stratified model of accountability calibrated to the level of autonomy and risk profile of the system in question. Part IV examines due process and fundamental rights implications of algorithmic decision-making, with reference to administrative and constitutional law. Part V addresses the novel and rapidly evolving questions of intellectual property and data ownership generated by AI systems. Part VI surveys the global regulatory landscape, evaluating recent legislative developments and making the case for a coordinated international governance framework. Part VII concludes with a normative argument for a principled, adaptive, and experimentally grounded approach to AI law.

2. Conceptual Foundations: Law, Technology, and the Automation Gap

2.1 Law's Response to Technological Disruption: A Historical Overview

Legal history is replete with examples of disruptive technologies that initially outpaced the law and eventually prompted doctrinal innovation. The invention of the printing press precipitated new regimes of censorship and intellectual property. The railway gave rise to modern tort doctrine and regulatory agencies. The automobile reshaped products liability, insurance law, and urban planning regulation. The internet forced a wholesale reconsideration of jurisdiction, privacy, and speech norms. In each case, the law ultimately adapted—but the process was slow, contested, and attended by significant transitional harm.

What distinguishes AI from prior technological disruptions is not merely its scope or speed, though both are unprecedented—but its cognitive character. Previous technologies extended human physical or communicative capacity; AI extended, and in some domains surpasses, human cognitive capacity. This creates what Marchetti has termed the substitution problem: when technology can perform not merely physical acts but the reasoning processes that underline legal agency, the conceptual infrastructure of law is challenged at its foundations.[2]

2.2 The Automation Gap

The automation gap describes the interval between the deployment of an autonomous system and the development of appropriate legal norms to govern it.[3] This gap is structural rather than merely temporal: it arises not simply because legislators are slow, but because the adaptive, learning character of AI systems means that by the time norms are developed for the system as it was, the system may have become something qualitatively different.

The gap is compounded by an epistemic asymmetry. AI

developers possess detailed technical knowledge of their systems' architecture and training data but cannot always predict emergent behavior. Regulators and courts possess normative authority but lack the technical expertise to evaluate AI systems in depth. Users interact with systems whose inner workings are entirely opaque to them. This three-way asymmetry—technical knowledge without normative authority, normative authority without technical knowledge, interaction without understanding—defines the governance challenge.

2.3 Agency, Personhood, and the Problem of Autonomous Action

Several commentators have proposed extending legal personhood to sufficiently sophisticated AI entities—a proposal that, while intellectually provocative, raises intractable difficulties. Legal personhood has historically served instrumental purposes: facilitating legal relationships, enabling the holding of property, and distributing responsibility among identifiable actors. Granting personhood to AI would risk creating liability sinks—entities legally responsible but practically unsatisfiable—while simultaneously obscuring the human choices and commercial interests that lie behind every deployed AI system.

Floridi and Cowls have proposed a more measured framework, distinguishing between moral agents (entities that can bear responsibility) and moral patients (entities deserving of moral consideration).[4] On this view, current AI systems are neither in any robust sense; they occupy a novel intermediate category. Rather than forcing AI into existing categories of natural or legal personhood, the law should develop sui generis frameworks that address the distinctive features of intelligent systems—autonomy, opacity, adaptability, and scalability—without the conceptual distortions introduced by personhood attribution.

2.4 The Explainability Imperative

A recurring theme in the literature is the demand for explainability: the capacity to give an account of why an AI system produced a particular output. This demand is normatively grounded in values of transparency, accountability, and the right to know the reasons for decisions that affect one's interests. It is technically contested: the most powerful AI systems—deep neural networks with billions of parameters—are, in a meaningful sense, not interpretable by any currently available method.[5]

Post-hoc explanation methods such as LIME (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) and SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) provide local approximations of model behaviour but do not constitute genuine mechanistic accounts of decision causation. The law's demand for explanations may therefore be demanding something that the current state of AI science cannot provide. This is not an argument against the explainability requirement—it is an argument for investing in the development of genuinely interpretable AI architectures as a legal and regulatory precondition for deployment in high-stakes domains.

3. Liability for AI-Caused Harm: Toward a Risk-Stratified Framework

3.1 The Inadequacy of Traditional Tort Doctrine

Traditional tort law requires, at minimum, the identification of a responsible actor, the establishment of a duty of care owed to the claimant, a breach of that duty, a causal link between the breach and the harm, and provable damage. Each element presents distinctive difficulties in the context of AI-caused harm, and together they combine to make recovery under existing doctrine difficult, uncertain, and often practically unavailable.

The duty of care question is relatively tractable: developers, manufacturers, and deployers of AI systems almost certainly owe duties of care to people foreseeably affected by those systems, and courts have generally been willing to recognize such duties without significant doctrinal innovation. The breach question is more complex: whether the design, training, deployment, or monitoring of an AI system fell below the standard of a reasonable actor is not susceptible to easy determination in the absence of technical benchmarks and industry standards, neither of which are well developed.

The question of causation is the most vexed. Deep learning systems arrive at outputs through processes that are not susceptible to straightforward causal narration. An injury caused by an autonomous vehicle may result from the interaction of millions of weighted parameters across dozens of neural network layers in response to a novel sensory environmental causal story that defies conventional legal articulation. The familiar but-for test breaks down entirely when the relevant counterfactual is not the absence of a discrete act but the non-existence of a complex stochastic system.

The problem of the many hands compounds these difficulties.[6] Modern AI systems are typically produced through a chain involving data providers, foundation model developers, fine-tuners, platform operators, and end users. Each party contributes to the system's behavior; none controls it entirely. When harm occurs, the causal contribution of each party is genuinely uncertain, and existing rules of joint and several liability, contribution, and indemnity are ill-suited to allocating responsibility along this complex value chain**.**

3.2 Products Liability and Its Limits

One promising avenue for AI liability is the extension of strict products liability doctrine. Under this approach, the developer or manufacturer of an AI system would bear liability for defects in design, manufacture, or instruction—irrespective of fault. This framework has the advantage of clarity and incentive-compatibility: it creates strong ex ante incentives for developers to invest in safety, shifts the cost of unavoidable harm to those best positioned to reduce it, and eliminates the need for claimants to prove fault in technically complex cases.

The difficulty is that AI systems are not static artefacts of the kind traditional products liability doctrine was designed to govern. They may learn, adapt, and change their behavior over time—potentially in ways not foreseen by the developer. A system that behaves safely at the time of deployment may become dangerous because of learning from deployment data. A model that was carefully audited for bias may develop new biases as its operational environment changes. The product, in other words, is not the same thing at the time of harm as it was at the time of salaries asking fundamental questions about the temporal scope of products' liability.

3.3 A Proposed Risk-Stratified Liability Model

This article proposes a tiered liability framework calibrated to the risk profile and degree of autonomy of the AI application in question. The taxonomy draws on but extends the risk classification adopted in the EU AI Act, incorporating additional criteria relating to the degree of human oversight and the reversibility of potential harm.

Tier 1 — Prohibited Systems: Systems posing unacceptable risk to fundamental rights, democratic processes, or human dignity—including real-time biometric mass surveillance in public spaces, AI-enabled social scoring by public authorities, and systems designed to exploit psychological vulnerabilities. Deployment is absolutely prohibited; criminal liability attaches to knowing deployment; civil liability is strict and unlimited.

Tier 2 — High-Risk Systems: Systems deployed in critical sectors including healthcare, criminal justice, employment, education, and critical infrastructure. Mandatory pre-deployment conformity assessment by an independent auditor; registration in a publicly accessible database; ongoing post-deployment monitoring; rebuttable presumption of developer and deployer liability upon proof of harm; mandatory insurance.

Tier 3 — Significant-Risk Systems: Systems that interact with members of the public in ways likely to influence significant decisions, including advanced generative AI models, recommender systems deployed at scale, and systems used in customer-facing financial services. Mandatory transparency and disclosure obligations; fault-based liability with a reversed burden of proof upon demonstration of harm; mandatory incident reporting.

Tier 4 — Limited-Risk Systems: Systems with restricted deployment context or limited interaction potential—including internal business automation, narrow AI tools used by professionals under human supervision. Standard negligence principles apply; voluntary codes of practice encouraged; safe harbor available for demonstrable compliance with published technical standards.

Tier 5 — Minimal-Risk Systems: Systems posing negligible societal risk, such as spam filters, simple recommendation algorithms, and basic automation tools. No specific AI liability rules apply; existing consumer protection, contract, and negligence principles govern without modification.

A critical element of this framework is the establishment of a mandatory AI incident reporting regime, analogous to the aviation safety reporting system, that would generate the empirical data necessary for adaptive regulatory response. Liability allocation under the framework must also grapple with the developer-deployer distinction: this article proposes joint and several liability as the default rule, with rights of contribution determined by relative fault and causal contribution

4. Algorithmic Decision-Making and Fundamental Rights

4.1 Due Process and the Right to an Explanation

Article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides individuals with a right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated processing that produce legal or similarly significant effects.[7] This right, while significant as a statement of principle, has been criticised for its operational inadequacy: the contours of a "meaningful explanation" remain contested, enforcement has been episodic, and the national implementing mechanisms vary considerably across Member States.

The problem is not merely one of legal drafting. It reflects a deeper tension between the legal culture of reason-giving—which demands articulable, contestable justifications for decisions—and the mathematical culture of machine learning—which optimises for predictive accuracy without regard for human-intelligible justification. Reconciling these cultures requires not only legal reform but investment in the field of explainable AI (XAI) as a matter of regulatory and commercial priority.

From a constitutional law perspective, automated administrative decisions raise serious due process concerns. The right to a hearing, the right to know the case against one, and the right to contest an adverse decision all presuppose that there is an intelligible case to know and contest. When a decision is generated by a model trained on historical data according to criteria that cannot be articulated in human language, the preconditions for meaningful procedural rights may not be met.

4.2 Equality, Bias, and Disparate Impact

Empirical research has extensively documented systematic biases in widely deployed AI systems.[8] The COMPAS recidivism risk assessment tool was found to generate false-positive rates for African American defendants nearly twice those for white defendants. Facial recognition systems deployed by law enforcement agencies have demonstrated error rates for darker-skinned women an order of magnitude higher than for lighter-skinned men. Hiring algorithms trained on historical data have been found to systematically disadvantage women and candidates from certain ethnic backgrounds.

These findings raise acute legal questions under anti-discrimination frameworks. The threshold question—whether disparate impact arising from neutral algorithmic processes constitutes unlawful discrimination—is answered differently across jurisdictions. In the United States, the disparate impact doctrine under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act provides a potential avenue of challenge, but courts have required evidence of discriminatory intent that is structurally difficult to establish against an opaque algorithmic system. The EU's framework of indirect discrimination, which does not require proof of intent, offers stronger formal protections, though the technical complexity of establishing causation in algorithmic discrimination cases remains a substantial practical barrier.

A further dimension of the equality problem is the feedback loop between AI predictions and social reality. A recidivism risk score that treats prior arrest as a predictive variable will replicate and entrench patterns of over-policing in communities of colour. A credit scoring algorithm trained on historical defaults in poor postcodes will perpetuate the exclusion of residents of those areas from affordable credit. Law must address not merely the discriminatory outputs of AI systems but the discriminatory dynamics they can generate and reinforce.

4.3 Privacy, Surveillance, and the Erosion of Anonymity

The combination of ubiquitous sensors, vast data storage, and powerful pattern-recognition AI has created surveillance capabilities that fundamentally alter the relationship between the individual and the state—and between individuals and private corporations. The aggregation problem, identified in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Carpenter v. United States (2018), recognises that the combination of individually innocuous data points can, through AI analysis, reveal intimate details of a person's life, associations, and beliefs that could not have been inferred from any single data point.[9]

The legal frameworks established in an era of physical surveillance—requiring reasonable expectation of privacy in discrete locations or communications—are inadequate to address an era of ambient, continuous, AI-enabled inference. New legal categories are required: a right against inferred information that is as robust as the right against intercepted information; constitutional and statutory limits on the use of AI for predictive identification and pre-crime intervention; and meaningful constraints on the aggregation and cross-referencing of datasets.

5. Intellectual Property, Data Ownership, and AI-Generated Content

5.1 Copyright and AI-Generated Works

The emergence of generative AI systems capable of producing sophisticated textual, visual, musical, and audiovisual works has precipitated a doctrinal crisis in copyright law. The foundational question—whether AI-generated works are eligible for copyright protection—has been answered in the negative by the United

States Copyright Office, which has consistently declined to register works produced without human creative input on the ground that copyright subsists in human expression, not machine output.

This position, while defensible as a matter of current statutory interpretation, raises difficult secondary questions. Where a human provides detailed creative direction to an AI system and substantially edits the output, does the resulting work attract copyright in the human's contribution? The Thaler v. Vidal and related decisions suggest that the law requires a human author, but the threshold of authorial contribution necessary to ground protection remains deeply uncertain.[10] The commercial stakes are substantial: AI-generated content now constitutes a significant and growing proportion of the content consumed across digital platforms, and the absence of clear copyright rules creates uncertainty for developers, deployers, and users alike.

5.2 Training Data, Fair Use, and the Consent Question

A separate but equally contested question concerns the lawfulness of training AI systems on copyrighted works without the consent of rights holders. The defendants in several major pending litigations—including Authors Guild v. OpenAI and related proceedings in the United States and United Kingdom—contend that the use of copyrighted text to train AI systems constitutes infringement of the reproduction right, notwithstanding the transformative character of the use.[11]

The fair use analysis in the US context requires balancing the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount of the work used, and the effect on the market for the original. The outcome is genuinely uncertain: training use is transformative in the sense that the purpose of consumption is to extract statistical patterns rather than to reproduce expressive content, but the scale of copying is vast, and the commercial value captured by the developer is substantial.

The deeper question is one of distributive justice: should the enormous economic value created by AI systems trained on the accumulated cultural production of human civilization be captured exclusively by the technology companies that built the systems, or should rights holders and creators receive some share of that value? This question is not adequately addressed by existing copyright doctrine and may require a legislative solution—such as a statutory licensing regime or a levy system—rather than judicial determination.

5.3 Data Ownership and the Governance of Training Sets

The development of large AI models requires access to massive datasets, the provenance, quality, and composition of which have profound effects on the behavior and fairness of the resulting systems. Existing data governance frameworks are ill-equipped to address the AI training context: data protection law regulates the processing of personal data for the purpose for which it was collected, not the extraction of statistical patterns from vast corpora.

A new framework of data commons governance may be required: one that addresses the terms on which data may be used for AI training, the rights of individuals and communities whose data is included, the obligations of developers to audit and disclose the composition of training sets, and the mechanisms by which harms attributable to defective or biased training data can be remedied. Several jurisdictions have begun to develop such frameworks—the EU Data Act (2023) and the emerging Indian data governance regime being the most significant—but a comprehensive international framework remains absent.

6. The Global Regulatory Landscape: Convergence, Divergence, and the Case for International Coordination

6.1 The European Union: A Risk-Based Regulatory Pioneer

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act, which entered into force in August 2024, represents the world's first comprehensive horizontal legislative framework for AI.[12] Structured around a risk-based taxonomy, the Act imposes graduated obligations on providers and deployers of AI systems, with particular stringency in high-risk application domains. Prohibited AI practices include real-time remote biometric identification in public spaces (with limited exceptions for law enforcement), AI systems that exploit psychological vulnerabilities, and social scoring systems operated by public authorities.

The Act establishes a governance architecture consisting of national competent authorities, a European AI Office, and a scientific panel of independent experts. It introduces a transparency regime for general-purpose AI models with significant systemic risk—defined as models trained on computational power exceeding 10^25 FLOPs—requiring safety evaluations, adversarial testing, incident reporting, and cybersecurity measures.

The Act has attracted both admiration and criticism. Proponents argue that it establishes a principled and workable framework that may serve as a global template—a Brussels Effect in the AI domain analogous to the extraterritorial influence of GDPR. Critics contend that its compliance architecture is overly bureaucratic, that its enforcement mechanisms are insufficiently robust relative to the capabilities of large technology companies, and that its fundamental rights safeguards are less protective in practice than they appear on paper.

Complementing the AI Act is the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, opened for signature in September 2024.[13] The Convention—the first binding international instrument in the field—extends beyond EU Member States to include countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, and establishes minimum standards for the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in AI system development and deployment.

6.2 The United States: Sectoral Regulation and the Soft-Law Approach

The United States has adopted a predominantly sectoral, soft-law approach to AI governance, reflecting the longstanding American preference for regulatory minimalism in the technology sector. Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI (October 2023) directed federal agencies to develop sector-specific guidance, required developers of the most powerful AI models to report safety test results to the federal government, and established an AI Safety Institute within the National Institute of Standards and Technology.[14]

Congressional efforts to develop comprehensive AI legislation have remained fragmented, with competing bills addressing specific high-priority concerns—deepfakes, AI in elections, algorithmic transparency in hiring, and the regulation of foundation models—without coalescing around a unified framework. The absence of federal preemption has produced a growing patchwork of state legislation: California's AI transparency requirements, Colorado's law on high-risk AI in consequential decisions, and Texas's prohibition on certain uses of AI in employment have created a complex compliance landscape for companies operating nationally.

6.3 China: State-Directed AI Governance

China has pursued a more directive regulatory approach, enacting the Provisions on the Management of Algorithmic Recommendations (2022), the Provisions on the Administration

of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services (2022), and the Interim Measures for the Management of Generative AI Services (2023).[15] These instruments collectively impose obligations of transparency, non-discrimination, content governance, and security assessment on AI service providers operating in China, while also serving as instruments of content control and censorship.

The Chinese model reflects a fundamentally different conception of the relationship between AI governance and state interest: where EU and US frameworks are primarily oriented toward the protection of individual rights and market competition, the Chinese framework subordinates' individual rights to state security and social stability objectives. Understanding this divergence is essential for any assessment of the prospects for international regulatory convergence.

6.4 India: Developmental Ambition and Regulatory Emergence

India's approach to AI governance has been shaped by a tension between developmental aspiration—the ambition to become a global AI hub—and the emerging recognition of the need for rights-protective regulatory frameworks.[16] The NITI Aayog's National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (2018) framed AI primarily as an instrument of economic and social development, with limited regulatory content. The subsequent Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) addresses the processing of personal data but does not comprehensively regulate AI systems.

The proposed Digital India Act, anticipated to replace the Information Technology Act of 2000, is expected to address AI governance more comprehensively, including provisions on algorithmic accountability, AI-enabled harms, and the regulation of foundation models. India's distinctive challenge is to develop a regulatory framework that is protective of fundamental rights while remaining conducive to the development of an indigenous AI ecosystem capable of serving the developmental needs of its 1.4 billion citizens.

6.5 The Case for International Coordination

The transnational character of AI systems renders purely domestic regulation structurally insufficient. A model trained in the United States on globally sourced data, fine-tuned in Europe, deployed through infrastructure in Singapore, and used by citizens in India creates jurisdictional complexities that existing rules of private international law are not designed to resolve. Regulatory divergence between jurisdictions creates arbitrage incentives that undermine the effectiveness of the most protective national regimes.

This article endorses calls for a binding multilateral instrument on AI governance that would establish: (i) minimum safety standards for high-risk AI systems, applicable regardless of where the system is developed or deployed; (ii) a mutual recognition framework for conformity assessments, reducing duplication while maintaining minimum standards; (iii) a cross-border incident reporting and response mechanism; (iv) principles governing the extraterritorial application of national AI regulations; and (v) a multilateral dispute resolution mechanism for AI-related state-to-state disputes.[17] The Bletchley Declaration on AI Safety (2023), signed by representatives of twenty-eight countries and the EU, represents a first step in this direction, though it remains aspirational rather than legally binding

7. Conclusion: Toward a New Legal Paradigm for Artificial Intelligence

The governance of artificial intelligence is among the most consequential legal challenges of the twenty-first century. Existing legal categories—forged in an era of human agency, physical causation, and territorial jurisdiction—are ill-equipped to address the distinctive features of autonomous, adaptive, and opaque systems that can cause harm at scale, at speed, and without intent. The mismatch is not a temporary condition to be remedied by incremental legislative adjustment; it reflects a structural challenge to the conceptual foundations of law itself.

This article has argued for a comprehensive reform agenda structured around five principles. The first is the principle of risk proportionality: regulatory obligations and liability rules should be calibrated to the severity and probability of harm, with the most stringent requirements reserved for the highest-risk applications. The second is the principle of transparency: developers and deployers of AI systems should be required to disclose the nature, capabilities, limitations, and known failure modes of their systems to the extent technically possible and consistent with legitimate intellectual property interests.

The third is the principle of accountability: every AI system deployed in a consequential context should be traceable to identifiable human actors who bear legal responsibility for its design, training, deployment, and monitoring. The fourth is the principle of fairness: AI systems that affect the distribution of rights, opportunities, and resources must be designed, audited, and continuously monitored for discriminatory impact across all relevant protected characteristics. The fifth is the principle of international coordination: the governance of AI cannot be left to fragmented national regimes and must ultimately be grounded in binding international instruments that establish shared minimum standards.

These principles do not resolve the myriad specific doctrinal questions addressed in the preceding Parts—the precise standard of care for AI developers, the optimal allocation of liability along the AI value chain, the appropriate threshold of human creative contribution to ground AI-assisted works in copyright, or the technical criteria for meaningful explainability. These questions require ongoing dialogue among legal scholars, technical researchers, and policymakers, and the answers will necessarily evolve as the technology evolves.

What these principles do provide is a normative framework within which that ongoing dialogue can be conducted: a framework oriented toward the protection of human dignity, the vindication of fundamental rights, the equitable distribution of the benefits and risks of AI, and the preservation of the conditions of democratic self-governance. Law and technology are not inherently antagonists. The law has always adapted to the technologies of its era. The challenge posed by artificial intelligence is one of pace, complexity, and conceptual depth—not of kind. The task for legal scholars, judges, and legislators is not to resist intelligent machines but to ensure that they remain instruments of human flourishing rather than sources of irreversible harm. That task is urgent; it is achievable; and it is the defining legal project of our time

Ethical Statement

This article is a theoretical and doctrinal legal research study. It does not involve human participants, animal subjects, clinical trials, or the collection of personal data. Accordingly, ethical approval from an institutional review board or ethics committee was not required. Not Applicable.

Conflict of Interest

The author(s) declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this manuscript. No financial or personal relationships with other people or organisations have inappropriately influenced or biased the work presented herein.

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